Matching Function Equilibria with Partial Assignment: Existence, Uniqueness and Estimation

Abstract

We argue that models coming from a variety of fields, such as matching models and discrete choice models among others, share a common structure that we call matching function equilibria with partial assignment. This structure includes an aggregate matching function and a system of nonlinear equations. We provide a proof of existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium and propose an efficient algorithm to compute it. For a subclass of matching models, we also develop a new parameter-free approach for constructing the counterfactual matching equilibrium. It has the advantage of not requiring parametric estimation when computing counterfactuals. We use our procedure to analyze the impact of the elimination of the Social Security Student Benefit Program in 1982 on the marriage market in the United States. We estimate several candidate models from our general class of matching functions and select the best fitting model using information based criterion.