Preferences, Inequality, and Coalitions: The Political Economy of (the Lack of Support for) Basic Income in Catalonia

Abstract

Recent research has substantially advanced our understanding of individual preferences towards Universal Basic Income (UBI), yet comparatively little is known about the structural and macroeconomic factors shaping their political translation. This article addresses this gap by examining Catalonia, Spain. Using previously unexplored statistical data, it shows that economically precarious individuals express the strongest support for UBI. Yet, as outsiders of a dualised labour market and losers from a highly contributory welfare system, they constitute a political precariat whose marginal position limits their influence within parties and unions, and among other key political actors. Framing these dynamics within a broader political economy perspective, we argue that understanding individual preferences alone is insufficient: structural barriers rooted in economic and labour-market institutions condition the extent to which widespread support can translate into political mobilisation and the formation of socio-political coalitions advocating for UBI.