Fragmentalist Molinism

Abstract

Abstract The Grounding Objection alleges that Molinist counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) lack prevolitional truthmakers, while a related Alternative Possibilities Objection maintains that any determinate prevolitional basis for such ‘would’-facts threatens the alternative possibilities required for libertarian freedom. I propose Fragmentalist Molinism, which combines a Finean truthmaker-semantic account of CCFs with a fragmentalist metaphysics of providential and agential facts. Each true CCF is grounded by a contingent, content-structured exact verifier whose corresponding fact belongs to a Divine Providential Fragment, while the facts concerning the creature’s intrinsic powers and alternative possibilities belong to a distinct Creaturely Freedom Fragment. Truth remains absolute, since the fragment indices record the membership of facts rather than relativising truth itself. I formalise this structure through a partial semantics and a labelled proof theory that preserves classical reasoning within each fragment, prohibits unrestricted conjunction across incompatible fragments, and admits only independently warranted bridge principles. The resulting framework answers the Grounding Objection through exact verifiers, while answering the Alternative Possibilities Objection by showing that the providential ground of what an agent would freely do does not thereby ground the agent’s inability to do otherwise.