The Inadequacy of Selective Apologies

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article examines the ethical shortcomings of selective apologies: cases in which a party apologises for one instance of injustice while refusing to apologise for others. Existing work on apologies has not addressed the particular kind of wrongdoing associated with the making of selective apologies. Apologising to one victim but refusing to apologise to another without good reason adds insult to injury. One is both failing to fulfil an existing duty, and adding an additional dimension of disrespect to one's extant moral failing. In addition, the making of a selective apology may undermine other apologies that one has made. Selectively apologising could only be permissible if one had well‐founded reasons to prioritise some cases over others. Determining if this is true necessitates an honest accounting and evaluation of the full range of one's past wrongdoing. The article develops this argument in three stages: first, by analysing contemporary examples of selective apologies, with a particular focus on the British state; second, by exploring the normative structure of selectively apologising, and third, by considering how the passage of time and the scale of political responsibility complicate the ethics of state apology.