The Case for Human Dignity in Neurotechnology Governance: A Latin American Perspective Beyond Freedom of Thought

Abstract

Abstract The academic debate on the governance of neurotechnology has progressively shifted from proposals to create new lists of so-called neurorights toward the reinterpretation of existing human rights, with freedom of thought attracting particular attention, among a broader set of candidate rights. This article examines whether freedom of thought can currently perform that anchoring role in Latin American jurisdictions. Drawing on a comparative analysis of constitutional texts, jurisprudence, and the Inter-American human rights system, the article argues that freedom of thought does not yet possess a clear, strong, and autonomous normative content in Latin American domestic law and in its regional human rights system. As a complementary and, in the region, more operative anchor, it argues that human dignity, which in several Latin American constitutional orders functions as an absolute autonomous fundamental right of direct application with extensive jurisprudential development, constitutes a more operationally effective legal basis for absolute prohibitions on the use of people as instruments or objects, and can protect them from coercive neurotechnological interventions. The article proposes that human dignity supplies the absolute floor against instrumentalization and coercion, while freedom of thought, as its doctrinal development advances, can complement that floor with the protection of the forum internum . It further contends that any rights-based strategy is structurally insufficient on its own, because rights depend on judicial interpretation that is inherently contextual and contingent, and therefore supports a multilevel governance approach combining the interpretation of existing rights, soft-law principles, and potential specific hard-law provisions.