Representative Bureaucracy in Private Philanthropy: Testing Discretion and Racial Representation in Community Foundation Grantmaking

Abstract

As public service delivery increasingly involves non-governmental actors, public administration theory needs to examine how its core frameworks operate beyond traditional bureaucracies. This study extends representative bureaucracy theory to private philanthropy, an increasingly crucial actor in local public service delivery, by testing whether racial representation in leadership corresponds with equitable grantmaking outcomes. Analyzing longitudinal data from 912 U.S. community foundations between 2012 and 2016, this study finds that racial representation in foundation leadership corresponds with increased grantmaking to organizations serving communities of color when leadership retains sufficient discretion, but that this relationship weakens as donor control rises, particularly through donor advised funds. These patterns are consistent with representative bureaucracy theory's emphasis on discretion as a key mechanism linking passive and active representation. These findings advance theoretical understanding by illuminating the interplay between representation and discretion within private philanthropy, while carrying implications for equitable resource distribution as public services increasingly involve non-governmental actors.