Non-Persuasive Choice Architecture in Environments of Mass Cognitive Hubris: Political LTV and Administrative Lock-In Mechanisms

Abstract

Conventional democratic theory posits an empirical feedback loop where an informed citizenry evaluates policy outcomes and holds elected officials accountable. However, modern electoral politics suffers from systemic epistemic failure driven by mass cognitive hubris—a societal-scale Dunning-Kruger effect amplified by algorithmic polarization—and severe short-term arbitrage. Political actors exploit this dynamic by executing rapid "populist exits," inflating immediate polling metrics while transferring long-term structural liabilities to future administrations. This paper presents a non-persuasive choice architecture that bypasses the necessity of public enlightenment or interpersonal persuasion. By integrating startup valuation methodologies—specifically Political Lifetime Value ($LTV_p$)—with administrative lock-in mechanisms, we formalize a quantitative governance framework that mathematically binds executive political capital to long-term actuarial solvency. We demonstrate how open-source protocols, default settings, and decentralized choice architecture preserve institutional resilience and protect sovereign innovation in environments of mass irrationality.