The Scope of the Duty of States to Cooperate with the United Nations

Abstract

Abstract Until quite recently, the question of the scope of States’ duty to cooperate with the United Nations, as enshrined in Article 2(5) of the Charter of the United Nations, had remained largely confined to academic discussions. According to the prevailing view in the literature, this duty is limited to the action undertaken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, and there has yet to be any meaningful practice to either support or challenge this interpretation. The humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip has, however, reshaped the landscape by bringing the duty to cooperate under Article 2(5) into sharp practical focus, with the issue making its way to The Hague in the context of advisory opinion proceedings before the International Court of Justice. This has permitted the first comprehensive insight into States’ understanding of the scope of this provision through their submissions to the Court. This article argues that these submissions demonstrate subsequent practice that supports an interpretation of Article 2(5) that is significantly broader than that advanced in the prevailing scholarship. It further suggests conceiving the duty to cooperate as a broad and flexible obligation of conduct–not exclusively triggered by action undertaken by the Security Council under Chapter VII–whose implementation may take a variety of forms and which must be fulfilled in good faith.