So similar, yet so different: comparing the US GAAP and IFRS experience at eliciting greater transparency on pension asset disclosures

Abstract

Abstract We exploit two regulatory changes, one under US GAAP and the other under IFRS, that mandate improved disclosure of pension asset allocation. While the changes are otherwise similar, US GAAP retains the expected rate of return (“ERR”) on pension assets, which preparers can more easily manipulate if asset allocation remains opaque, while IFRS eliminates the ERR. We find that the IFRS standard improves pension asset transparency more than the US standard, which only mandates higher-quality disclosure without changing recognition or measurement and hence leaves unchanged preparers’ incentives to obfuscate. The US standard elicits a mixed response that reduces transparency in some respects. We isolate the relative deterioration in US firms’ transparency to firms with stronger incentives to inflate ERRs. Overall, our study highlights the potential for standard setters to learn from each other by comparing their regulatory experience on a specific accounting topic with clearly identifiable managerial incentives.