Credit the advice, own the choice: governing expertise in German policymaking

Abstract

Abstract Democratic governments depend on expertise. Yet expert authority becomes fragile when advisory roles remain ill-defined, evidentiary and decision pathways cannot be reconstructed, disagreement is submerged beneath claims of consensus, or democratically accountable decision-makers recast value-laden choices as technical necessities. Treating expert advice as a problem of democratic institutional design, this article develops an expertise-legitimacy chain comprising calibrated advisory pluralism, auditable traceability, structured dissent and the clear attribution of political responsibility. It compares Germany’s 2022 Expert Commission on Gas and Heat, pandemic advisory arrangements and the Council of Experts on Climate Change. The comparison reveals a committee-centred system capable of mobilising scientific, stakeholder and implementation knowledge while sustaining statutory review. Its recurrent weakness lies in rendering the political use of advice publicly accountable. Role designations, proportionate documentation, uncertainty communication, structured dissent, ex post review and reasoned government responses can preserve democratic ownership by showing where expert assessment ends and political choice begins.