Propaganda, Administrative Deformation, and the Erosion of State Capacity: The Case of the “Censorship Industrial Complex”

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper examines how a propaganda frame alleging the existence of a “Censorship Industrial Complex” was institutionalized and then helped justify the dismantling of US election information resilience infrastructure across multiple federal agencies. Drawing on documentary evidence and process tracing, we show how political entrepreneurs reframed routine, non‐coercive election information coordination and communication practices as a covert censorship regime targeting conservative speech. The article argues that this case is best understood as administrative deformation: weakly evidenced claims were laundered into higher‐status venues, including congressional investigations, litigation, executive action, and budget rationales, where they altered the incentive environment facing public agencies. The result was staff reductions, program cuts, and chilling effects, and weakened state capacity in a core domain of democratic administration. We conclude with recommendations for protecting administrative resilience under conditions of narrative attack.