Research on Game-Theoretic Behavior of Collective Emergency Evacuation in Wildfire Under the Drive of Individual Risk Perception

Abstract

The increasing frequency of wildfires has made large-scale collective emergency evacuation increasingly critical. However, existing studies provide limited understanding of how information structures shape the interaction between individual risk perception and collective evacuation behavior. This study develops a collective evolutionary game-based evacuation framework under ambiguous and clear information conditions. Under ambiguous information, individual heterogeneity in risk sensitivity, mobility, and resource endowment is incorporated into social interaction payoffs. Under clear information, observable evacuation consequences, including travel time, risk exposure, and congestion effects derived from route-choice interactions, are incorporated into evacuation utility. Numerical simulations examine the evolutionary characteristics of collective evacuation behavior under different information conditions and population scales. The results show that social interactions play an important role in shaping evacuation decisions under ambiguous information, while congestion effects and route-choice interactions influence evacuation utility under large-scale demand. Sensitivity analyses further demonstrate that congestion representation affects evacuation utility across different population scales. These findings highlight the importance of considering information structure, individual heterogeneity, and collective interactions in evacuation modeling. Emergency management should therefore improve risk communication, evacuation capacity, and congestion mitigation strategies. This study provides theoretical insights into collective evacuation decision-making under heterogeneous information conditions.