Toward an Ontology of Family: F-A-M-I-L-Y as a Care-Constituted Relational Nexus

Abstract

Family science lacks a shared ontological account of its central referent: what kind of thing F-A-M-I-L-Y is remains unclear. This gap undermines theoretical coherence, inhibits cumulative knowledge-building, and weakens the field’s policy relevance. The essay traces how family science inherited distinct frames from parent disciplines at founding, without consolidating a shared ontological account. Drawing on the metaphysics of organized and feature social groups and the philosophy of deliberate care, the essay applies systematic ontological analysis to F-A-M-I-L-Y as a candidate distinct social kind. Comparison across six metaphysical dimensions reveals that F-A-M-I-L-Y shares features with organized groups but diverges in structural-functional organization, collective intentionality, member volition, and the source of these shared features. These are not definitional failures; they are a coherent ontological pattern. The paper suggests that F-A-M-I-L-Y is a care-constituted relational nexus: a structured web of care-bonds among particular persons, constituted by deliberate care oriented toward the adequate viability of those persons through the real conditions of their existence. This framework resolves apparent tensions between embattled conceptions of F-A-M-I-L-Y, accommodates technological complexity in reproduction, and provides actionable methodological guidance for researchers. Ontological precision and genuine inclusiveness are not competing goods; the care-constitution framework demonstrates they are mutually reinforcing.