Universal Basic Income in Illiberal Regimes

Abstract

Abstract Illiberal regimes increasingly rely on “soft repression” that weaponizes economic precarity while preserving a veneer of legality. This article develops a theoretical framework demonstrating how Universal Basic Income (UBI) alters the strategic interaction between citizens and the state. By guaranteeing survival independent of political compliance, UBI lowers the personal cost of moderate dissent, functions as a universal “strike fund” facilitating collective action, and solves coordination problems by reducing the fear of exemplary punishment in moderate dissent. More importantly, UBI raises the threshold for repression. By neutralizing cheap and deniable economic coercion, it forces illiberal regimes either to tolerate higher levels of dissent or to escalate to more visible and costlier forms of “hard” repression. The article concludes that UBI should be understood as more than a social policy. It is a political institution that fortifies the material conditions necessary for exercising civil liberties under stress.