Certifiable Integrity, Verifiable Limits: Anti-Bribery Certification and Public Procurement Reform in Peru

Abstract

This article examines the legal significance of using ISO 37001 anti-bribery certification as an integrity-related factor in Peruvian public procurement. Its claim is doctrinal and comparative rather than causal: ISO 37001 can operate as a useful risk-management heuristic, but it should not be treated as proof of integrity or as a substitute for public verification. The article strengthens the comparison with EU procurement law by distinguishing the assessment of the economic operator from the evaluation of the tender. In EU law, certificates and self-declarations such as the European Single Procurement Document (ESPD) are often used to reduce administrative burden at the selection or qualification stage, while award criteria under the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) logic must remain connected to the contract and to the comparative evaluation of offers. Peru’s distinctive issue is that ISO 37001 is used as a scored award-stage signal under the rubric of integrity in public procurement. Drawing on Peruvian law, EU procurement-law literature, ISO 37001 materials, and regulatory-intermediary theory, the article proposes a staged integrity-screening model: admission through self-declarations and integrity pacts; qualification through operator-suitability checks and equivalent evidence; limited award-stage scoring only when justified by procurement risk; and execution-stage corroboration through contract controls and corporate-liability enforcement.