Counterfactual Identification of Institutional Rupture: Evidence From Constitutional Transformation in Venezuela

Abstract

How can institutional rupture be identified in settings where the treated unit is singular, interventions are composite, and institutional deterioration unfolds through mutually reinforcing constitutional, political, and legal transformations? We develop a counterfactual framework for identifying systemic judicial rupture in single-unit settings using synthetic-control methods, generalized synthetic controls, synthetic difference-in-differences, matrix completion, placebo inference, and latent institutional measurement. We apply the framework to Venezuela following the 1999 constitutional overhaul under Hugo Chávez. Across nine dimensions of judicial integrity, we document a large, persistent, and system-wide post-1999 divergence relative to multiple counterfactual constructions, including regional and worldwide donor pools. To address concerns regarding outcome proliferation and measurement instability, we construct a latent judicial quality index using principal-components analysis and show that the estimated rupture remains exceptionally strong across all specifications. The article contributes a general empirical framework for studying institutional collapse, constitutional backsliding, and judicial capture in environments where traditional panel approaches are poorly suited to the object of inference.