Challenges and opportunities of solar geoengineering for climate governance

Abstract

Purpose This review characterizes the governance challenges arising from the potential deployment of solar geoengineering. The authors survey existing theoretical models that analyze the strategic incentives such technologies generate. In particular, this study examines the conditions under which the “free-driver problem”, where a single nation or small group of nations initiates solar geoengineering without the consent of the international community, might be avoided or mitigated and explores the implications for international climate governance when mitigation and solar geoengineering policies interact. Design/methodology/approach The authors focus on a subset of theoretical contributions and examine them in depth to clarify the mechanisms underlying free-driving and to explore potential solutions. Findings Overall, the literature suggests that governance mechanisms such as voting rules, transfer schemes and self-enforcing agreements can, in principle, mitigate free-driving and support stable cooperation on solar geoengineering. Theoretical models indicate that geoengineering may either undermine or strengthen incentives for mitigation and international cooperation, and under specific conditions can even facilitate the formation of large climate agreements avoiding its deployment. Originality/value By bringing together insights from public good, coalition formation and game theoretical literature, this review highlights the conditions under which cooperation can emerge and identifies key gaps for future research on the governance of solar geoengineering.