INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MOGADISHU SYNDROME

Abstract

The 1994 Rwandan genocide remains one of the clearest examples of the international community’s failure to prevent mass atrocities despite credible warnings of impending violence. This paper examines the roles of Belgium, the United Nations Secretariat, the United States, and France, arguing that political unwillingness rather than lack of information enabled the genocide to unfold. It further compares the Rwandan crisis with the humanitarian intervention in Somalia, distinguishing the relative success of the United Task Force (UNITAF) from the shortcomings of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), whose politicized approach and misuse of humanitarian resources undermined its legitimacy. The study contends that the principal lesson from Somalia was not that humanitarian intervention should be avoided, but that ineffective and biased intervention strategies produce failure. By evaluating humanitarian intervention through the principles of legitimacy, sovereignty, and ethical responsibility, the paper argues for clear eligibility criteria to guide international action in preventing genocide and protecting vulnerable populations