No Conscious Units: A Relational Theory of Consciousness and the Dissolution of the AI Consciousness Question

Abstract

This paper challenges a largely unexamined assumption of contemporary consciousness studies: that consciousness is an intrinsic property of objects. Drawing on the Madhyamaka analysis of emptiness (sunyata) and dependent origination, and on independent convergences in relational quantum mechanics and ontic structural realism, we defend the Relational Thesis of Consciousness (RTC): consciousness is not a property of any entity but an event that arises as interaction between entities — there are no conscious units in the universe, only interactions of which experience is predicable. We offer a proof by exhaustion: the intrinsic assumption generates three constitutive explanatory failures (the hard problem, the explanatory gap, the combination problem), each of which dissolves relationally. A corollary shows that the question "Is an AI system conscious?" is a category error. We situate RTC among enactive, extended, illusionist, and panpsychist positions, and draw methodological and ethical consequences. The author used AI assistance in drafting and editing this manuscript.