Terminus: Against the Cognitive Prerequisite for Algorithmic Justice

Abstract

The right to explanation is the standard answer—but we think it is the wrong one. The problem is not that explanations are impossible—they are not, at least not always—but that requiring them imposes a hidden burden that systematically falls on those least able to carry it. This is not a technical glitch. It is a structural flaw in how we have designed procedural justice for the algorithmic age. We propose an alternative: the Terminus Declaration. When a citizen has received an explanation and reached the boundary of their cognitive capacity, they should be able to say so—and that statement should end the explanatory phase of the proceeding, triggering instead a review of the system's justification by an independent auditor. The burden shifts from the citizen's understanding to the system's accountability. This is not a concession to ignorance. It is an acknowledgment that the demand for universal comprehension is itself a form of coercion, and that legitimate governance must accommodate the cognitive finitude of those it governs.