Mikio Hanaeda

Shapes, Not Strengths: Publicity, the Deterrence Feedback, and When a Jump Can Be Destroyed

An administration that publishes its findings chooses how loudly to publish, and that choice does two things at once. It changes how large the sanction looks to those who might incur it, and it changes what the enforcement apparatus subsequently sees, because a violation deterred...

The Shape of Deterrence: What a Harbour's Silence Reveals, and What It Cannot

An administration operating under a cap on how tightly it must regulate can also choose how loudly to do so, and publicity is not free. It buys deterrence, and it burns a floor that protects the monitors working beneath it. Where those two things decay at the wrong relative rate...

The Shape of Deterrence: What a Harbour's Silence Reveals, and What It Cannot

An administration operating under a cap on how tightly it must regulate can also choose how loudly to do so, and publicity is not free. It buys deterrence, and it burns a floor that protects the monitors working beneath it. Where those two things decay at the wrong relative rate...

Closing the Compounding Seat: Equilibrium Charge-Setting on a Destructible Seat

A monitor whose seat compounds and whose own inattention can destroy it grows more attentive as it grows more prudent: the classical penalty paradox inverts. That is a decision problem’s result — the charge is a parameter of the environment, and it leaves open the question a para...

The Price of Publicity: Loudness, Deterrence, and What a Revealed Rate Cannot Rank

An administered liability shelter can be operated loudly or quietly, and publicity is not free to the people it shelters: every unit of it lowers the threshold below which they are safe, while the deterrence it buys accrues to nobody inside the shelter. An administrator choosing...

The Price of Publicity: Loudness, Deterrence, and What a Revealed Rate Cannot Rank

An administered liability shelter can be operated loudly or quietly, and publicity is not free to the people it shelters: every unit of it lowers the threshold below which they are safe, while the deterrence it buys accrues to nobody inside the shelter. An administrator choosing...

The Inefficient Stake: Blame, Coverage, and the Welfare Case for a Cap

When a monitor is made to bear more of the blame for what he fails to catch, he is expected to look harder. On the fold this programme has been studying he does the opposite. Raising his stake raises the share of blame that attaches to him faster than it lowers the chance there i...

The Geometry of the Regime Space: How the Strategic-Inattention Boundary Bifurcates at a Cusp

The many models of this programme are one payoff, and the boundary that sorts them into strategic-inattention and active regimes is not a single surface: past a cusp in the production response it bifurcates into a hysteretic band, and it is inside that band—on the productive subs...

The Geometry of the Regime Space: How the Strategic-Inattention Boundary Bifurcates at a Cusp

The many models of this programme are one payoff, and the boundary that sorts them into strategic-inattention and active regimes is not a single surface: past a cusp in the production response it bifurcates into a hysteretic band, and it is inside that band—on the productive subs...

What the Data Can See: Sheet-Specific Information Signatures of the Strategic-Inattention Fold

The strategic-inattention trap studied by a companion regime-space analysis presents, as a stakes parameter is varied, a fold with three distinct sheets: a boundary collision at which the trap configuration is born — the recovery boundary, below which a trapped unit returns to en...

What the Data Can See: Sheet-Specific Information Signatures of the Strategic-Inattention Fold

The strategic-inattention trap studied by a companion regime-space analysis presents, as a stakes parameter is varied, a fold with three distinct sheets: a boundary collision at which the trap configuration is born — the recovery boundary, below which a trapped unit returns to en...

The Coupled Portfolio: Relative Blame and the Anti-Markowitz Geometry of Oversight

Recurring oversight blind spots — an auditor who misses a specialist's error — are increasingly read as equilibria: where blame for a missed failure rises with how much a monitor could see, seeing less is a way to bear less. A companion model shows the blind spot survives across...

The Erosion of Conscience Institutions as Metastable Equilibria over an Endogenous Type-Mix

A companion paper shows that professional duty dismantles the strategic-inattention trap of an oversight model, taking a monitor’s conscience as given. This paper endogenizes it and asks whether the institution that runs on conscience tends to keep it. It does not. Careers are se...

What a Panel Can Measure: Windows, Clocks, and the Identication of Strategic Inattention

A research programme on strategic inattention in internal control has established, theoretically, that recurring IT-related control failures can arise as the fold dynamics of a no-collusion equilibrium observed through a one-sided visibility filter: the fall into the inattention...

One Adjudicator, Many Substrates: A Negligence Microfoundation of the Reach-Contingent Blame Dierential

Across a sequence of models of oversight — a vertical cascade, an observation portfolio, a dynamic rotation process — the blame a monitor bears for a surfaced failure rises with his own observability, a reach-contingent differential that drives strategic inattention, low-observab...

An Equilibrium Without Collusion: Observability, Strategic Inattention, and the Recurrence of IT-Related Control Deficiencies

Recurring control deficiencies are conventionally traced to one of two sources: active collusion among the parties, or the principal–agent conflict between auditor and client. This paper argues for a third. It develops a three-player model—core auditor, IT specialist, and audited...

The Cascade of Inattention: Observability and Responsibility in Vertical Hierarchies

A companion working paper—the Equilibrium Without Collusion model (hereafter ewc; SSRN working paper, 2026)—showed that recurring control deficiencies can be an equilibrium without collusion: when a core auditor’s observability of a specialist’s work is low, declining to understa...

An Equilibrium Without Collusion: Observability, Strategic Inattention, and the Recurrence of IT-Related Control Deficiencies

Recurring control deficiencies are conventionally traced to one of two sources: active collusion among the parties, or the principal–agent conflict between auditor and client. This paper argues for a third. It develops a three-player model—core auditor, IT specialist, and audited...

The Cheapest Sacrifice: A Genealogy of Attribution Protocols

The payoff studied across this programme has always carried a term that prices unattributed failure: every agent bears $\Phi/2$ per unit of blame assigned to no one. This paper names that term — a demand for attribution — and shows the name is exact: the marginal valuation of att...

The Price of a Harbour Liability Design when Duty and Shame Share a Lever

A safe harbour caps the blame a monitor bears, and the internal-adjudicator companion (companion working paper, 2026) showed that this cap and a monitor’s cultivated duty are the two ends of a single lever on the blame share that drives strategic inattention. That analysis took t...