Deadly dates: The relationship between holy days and terrorism

Abstract

How do terror groups make strategic decisions regarding when to time their attacks? This study examines the logic underpinning attack timing and argues that non-state groups weigh the benefits of amplified psychological impacts during focal points for violence against the costs of conducting attacks during periods of heightened security. I test this proposition by examining religious holidays, which create unique opportunities for terror groups to maximize visibility and instill fear yet are also characterized by increased state security efforts since governments anticipate the risk of violence. I leverage the duration of holidays to illustrate the strategic logic of attack timing: while security measures are at their peak during short holidays, prolonged religious observances impose a strain on state resources, thereby reducing the cost to terror groups and increasing the likelihood of attacks. I test this theory using data from Arab League countries and illustrate the mechanism by analyzing news reports in Syria. The findings advance our understanding of how terror groups allocate scarce resources in response to security dynamics and have implications for counter-terrorism policies.