The Illusion of Sufficiency: Is Critical Thinking Skill Enough?

Abstract

This is the third and final article in the trilogy ‘The Illusion of Sufficiency’. The two earlier articles tested two content areas of critical thinking, logical fallacies and cognitive biases. They showed that knowing the names of these patterns, without applying them, does not cure the ignorance of our age. This article turns to critical thinking itself, as current training programmes use the term. It separates two recognised components: ‘skill’ (the capacity to analyse, to evaluate arguments and to infer) and ‘disposition’ (the lasting inclination to apply those same skills impartially). Drawing on Stanovich’s research programme on ‘dysrationalia’, the article argues that, at the level of intervention, the two components differ only slightly, and that this difference can be called real only with caution (Abrami’s meta-analysis: g = 0.30 for skill, against g = 0.23 for disposition). Two explanations are plausible: the domain-dependence of skill (Willingham) and the evolutionary function of reasoning, which serves the defence of a position more than the discovery of truth (Mercier and Sperber). The gap also has a social consequence. The charge of ‘lacking an epistemic disposition’ can become a tool for weaponising identity, and reasoning skill itself can shield a person’s own beliefs instead of exposing them. The article also explains why skill, which looks discrete, is easy to package and market, while disposition, which is continuous and long-term, is not. Finally, the article reviews the opposing evidence. It concludes that disposition can be taught, but that the evidence is limited. The only intervention that targeted disposition directly showed an effect, and any claim to cultivate disposition needs a measure that does not rely on self-report. Most current critical thinking programmes offer neither direct targeting nor such a measure.