Evidentiary Interpretation, Discursive Injustice, and Rap on Trial

Abstract

ABSTRACT The submission of rap lyrics as inculpatory evidence (Rap on Trial) is an active prosecution tactic deployed in United States criminal trials. In this paper, I argue that interpretive ambiguity in rap lyrics is exploited in Rap on Trial cases, constituting a novel form of discursive injustice: extractive discursive injustice. Rap, a historically Black American artform, has core oral‐traditional elements such as its usage of Signifyin(g) that render it interpretably ambiguous. Utilizing the concept of hermeneutical impasses, I explain how a pernicious interpretation of rap lyrics nonetheless receives evidentiary uptake, revealing a crucial junction where injustice seeps into the courtroom. I argue that two speech act‐theoretic sites of injustice are present in Rap on Trial cases, detailing how one strain—discursive injustice—occurs. In doing so, I theorize novel forms of constitutive refusal and discursive injustice that occur when an utterance is extracted from one conversational context and deposited into another. I argue these are distinct from traditional forms in the method of arisal, though congruent with their function and display. I conclude by addressing an objection questioning the denial of truth‐telling value within rap lyrics and considering how a valid evidential use of rap lyrics might occur.