Corrigibility and Continuity: A Philosophical Account of Temporally Constrained Revision

Abstract

Possessing a capacity for revision does not establish that its exercise remains possible in an episode where correction matters. A system may detect discordance, generate alternatives, or modify a policy while lacking the time or resources required for those operations to preserve the relevant continuity. This article develops a philosophical account of temporally constrained corrigibility. Its central question is when change counts as correction rather than mere alteration, replacement, or collapse. The account distinguishes corrective capacity, episode-specific feasibility, and successful correction; separates restitution, regulation, model or policy revision, and metacontrol; and analyses metacontrol through opening, redistribution, and exit. It then examines the continuity that correction presupposes. Neither persistence of components nor preservation of revision capacity supplies a sufficient criterion of identity. Correction requires an appropriate causal relationship to the system being changed, a declared domain of continuity, and an independently defensible preservation criterion. Applied to the life–mind continuity debate, the proposal identifies a limited functional problem shared by some living and some minded processes without identifying their mechanisms or establishing a boundary of mentality. The contribution is conceptual and integrative. It does not depend on demonstrating that a temporal index outperforms enriched dynamic models.