Did Congress Trade Ahead of the 2026 Iran War? Disclosure Delays and the Value of Early Entry

Abstract

Did Congress trade ahead of the 2026 Iran War? We examine 135 disclosed transactions made by members of Congress in ten geopolitically exposed industries during the escalation. Members traded heavily in industries that subsequently rose, and congressional trading volume peaked roughly two months before public attention, but they earned no first-mover advantage. We compare portfolios that track congressional transactions at trade dates against portfolios entering at public disclosure dates. Entering positions at transaction dates offers no tangible edge: Under member-clustered inference, the disclosure delay advantage, trade timing, and any committee premium are indistinguishable from zero. Members of the Armed Services and Intelligence committees show no return edge over other members. The Senate result reduces to four trades by three senators, of which three timely oil purchases supply the bulk of the advantage. The two exceptions are purchases in positively exposed industries, which earned a 7.28% abnormal return over the disclosure window across seven members, and marginally significant sales in the negatively exposed industries. Neither can be separated from informed reading of public escalation signals. Despite intense media scrutiny of congressional trading during the escalation, we find no evidence sufficient to attribute these returns to private information.