Fragile persistence: Elite coordination and authoritarian durability in North Korea

Abstract

This study explains why the North Korean regime has remained durable despite growing insecurity among political elites under Kim Jong Un. Rather than treating regime durability as evidence of elite cohesion or institutional strength, it introduces the concept of fragile persistence to explain how regime survival can coexist with substantial elite grievances. I argue that fragile persistence is sustained primarily by coordination failure among regime insiders. This study develops a simple formal model of elite coordination to show how regime persistence can arise even when continued personalist rule becomes increasingly costly for political insiders. The model highlights two conditions that reinforce this equilibrium: uneven distribution of political burdens across elites and pessimistic expectations about post-collapse outcomes. Drawing on recent developments in North Korea, the analysis shows how the deepening personalization of a highly personalized party-state simultaneously heightens elite insecurity while discouraging coordinated defection through discretionary personnel management, fragmented political incentives, and pessimistic post-collapse expectations. More broadly, the study contributes to the comparative study of authoritarian politics by shifting attention from regime-centered explanations of resilience to the strategic interactions among political elites and by distinguishing fragile persistence from stable authoritarian durability.