The structural political power of firms – and its boundaries

Abstract

This article examines the conditional importance of structural power in determining firms’ political influence. While structural power derived from firms’ economic size has been widely theorised as a key determinant of business influence, it is argued here that its effect is highly conditional, because it may be dampened by organisational, sector-level and institutional factors. Drawing on a unique survey of major firms in Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands, this article analyses corporate influence across parliamentary and bureaucratic venues. The findings show that structural power is most effective when it is activated by insider lobbying. Moreover, strong variation is found across countries in terms of how important structural power is to gain more influence. These results contribute to debates on corporate political activity by demonstrating that structural power is not automatic but depends on firms’ ability to strategically deploy their political resources through active lobbying. These findings have implications for theories of business power and the study of corporate influence in different institutional and sectoral settings.