Designing Counterexample Sequences for Interpretive Revision in Philosophical Discussions of Promises

Abstract

Counterexamples can reveal a learner's interpretation while also changing the distinctions available for subsequent inquiry. This paper examines the resulting sequencing problem in philosophical discussions of promises. It distinguishes a counterexample's logical force, diagnostic reliability, and formative role, and specifies a learning target that permits reasoned disagreement about substantive moral conclusions. A finite episode model represents responses and interpretive changes jointly. A stepwise backward construction characterizes the existence of an observation-based policy that establishes a declared target within a bounded number of episodes while preserving specified conditions. Two opposed witnesses show how common preparation can make immediate diagnosis inefficient and how latent prerequisites can make diagnosis necessary. A sustained fictional dossier connects these results to promise formation, release, competing responsibilities, explanations, and transfer. Verified philosophical, educational, and planning antecedents locate the proposal without a claim of conceptual priority. The argument concludes with responsibilities for target selection and participation, serious objections, and a design for empirical evaluation. The formal guarantees remain conditional on the representation; educational effectiveness and wider applicability remain open.