Hybridized advisory system: ministerial advisors and donor co-principalship in developing countries

Abstract

Ministerial advisors have become increasingly prominent actors in policy advisory systems, yet existing scholarship draws largely from the Global North, leaving significant gaps in understanding their roles in developing countries. Drawing on primary data, this study examines recruitment, positioning, and policy influence of ministerial advisors in the developing country context. The findings reveal that ministerial advisory roles are institutionalized through what this study theorizes as a hybridized advisory system (HAS), a configuration in which donors function as external advisory actors and as co-principals who define advisory mandates, recruit and finance ministerial advisors, and exercise veto-like authority alongside political principals. Once embedded in government, ministerial advisors exert substantial influence over policy design and implementation. Their relationships with bureaucrats are marked by persistent tension: bureaucrats consider them illegitimate intruders, while advisors perceive that bureaucrats lack technical expertise. The paper concludes that HAS offers an alternative analytical framework to existing models developed for advanced democracies. It also argues that strengthening in-house capacity is a necessary condition for building self-sustaining advisory systems.