The Decoupling of Money

Abstract

This paper proposes a monetary architecture that separates a nonholdable legal unit of account—the Stable—from a held, indexed monetary object—the Float. Relative movement discovered through market quotations remains in Stable prices, while an established common component across admitted comparable current-output quotations updates the Float–Stable relation. Float balances are re-expressed as that relation changes, allowing payment and monetary value preservation to remain together without giving demand for the held object direct authority over legal denomination. The resulting settlement-balance elasticity permits Float issuance to expand Stable-equivalent command without making settlement scarcity a condition of preserving the ruler. Current-output capacity, risk-bearing capacity, and foreign acceptance remain governing constraints. Material financial risk remains outside a fully matched payment core, while participating authorities may complete admitted payments without prior reserve acquisition, carrying residual imbalances as official positions. The paper follows the implications for capacity governance, productive finance, public action, monetary areas, and household command under extensive automation. It presents one purposefully nontechnical candidate within a wider design space; equilibrium and welfare properties, empirical identification, governance, transition, and international viability remain open. Working paper. This manuscript has not undergone peer review. JEL Classification: E42, E51, E61, F33, G21, O33.