The hunger games: procurement strategies under unmitigable supplier dominance

Abstract

Purpose Most procurement research assumes that buyers possess negotiation power and viable alternatives. However, such assumptions do not hold in practice, as buyers in many industries operate under unmitigable supplier dominance. Against this backdrop, we examine how weaker buyers configure procurement strategies to secure supplies under unmitigable supplier dominance. Design/methodology/approach We conduct a multiple case study of 11 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the Spanish agri-food sector, a setting characterized by high supply concentration and limited buyer leverage. These SMEs occupy the middle of the supply chains, positioned between powerful upstream and downstream agents. Findings We find that established procurement strategies can become infeasible, heavily constrained, or even counterproductive under supplier dominance. Their feasibility is bounded by two contingencies: the urgency and substitutability of supplies. Practical implications The findings provide managers with a feasibility-based decision logic for selecting procurement strategies under supplier dominance. Social implications This study highlights how concentration in supply markets creates systemic vulnerability in supply security, underscoring the need for regulatory frameworks that facilitate adaptive sourcing during crises. Originality/value This study develops a constraint-based view of procurement, demonstrating that under unmitigable supplier dominance, strategy feasibility precedes strategy selection.