Society & Economicspreprint2026-08-30

Price Without Negotiation: The Rule as a Limit Case for the Sociology of Valuation

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Abstract

The sociology of valuation has shown that markets for singular goods cannot determine quality as ordinary-goods markets do. Because a singularity's qualities are plural and incommensurable, such markets rely on judgment devices that guide buyers (Karpik 2010), pricing rituals that allow dealers to set prices without appearing overtly commercial (Velthuis 2005), and media dynamics that can detach market price from artistic recognition (Moureau 2026). This paper examines a limit case. Since 1 January 1993, the artistic practice studied here has defined one work for each day, realizable exactly once. Its displayed price is determined solely by the date, rises by a rule-fixed daily increment, and admits neither negotiation nor reduction within the formal system. The rule does not abolish valuation; it removes discretionary price-setting from the individual transaction. Judgment devices may still influence whether a day is chosen, and which day, but they can neither produce nor alter its price. Price remains a condition of the buyer's choice, but is not an outcome of that choice. The case thus isolates two operations that markets ordinarily combine: selecting an object and setting its price. Comparisons with Klein's Zones de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle (1959–1962) and Warhol's tariff-based commissioned portraits establish an ancestry for rule-pricing while showing what changes when a rule tracks time rather than sales, buyers, or commissions.

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View paper (DOI)Open access versionOpenAlexZenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)Published 2026-08-30

Authors: Christopher Temt

Institutions: The Korean Institute of Electrical and Electronic Material Engineers