Constitutional Federalism in India: Recalibrating Union–State Relations Through Collaborative Governance

Abstract

Abstract Indian federalism represents a constitutional balance between a strong Union and constitutionally protected spheres of State autonomy. This paper examines the changing dynamics of Union–State relations through the framework of constitutional federalism and collaborative governance. It analyzes the distribution of legislative and executive powers under Articles 245 and 246 and the Seventh Schedule, while also considering the constitutional significance of fiscal federalism, judicial review, and inter-governmental institutions. Particular attention is given to Article 200 and the constitutional role of the Governor in relation to Bills passed by State Legislatures, especially in light of the Supreme Court's 2025 Presidential Reference. The paper argues that federalism is a basic feature of the Indian Constitution and should be understood as a system of constitutional coordination rather than institutional subordination. It further examines contemporary challenges, including gubernatorial discretion, fiscal dependence, overlapping policy responsibilities, institutional asymmetry, and conflicts between different levels of government. The study advocates collaborative federalism based on negotiation, institutional restraint, meaningful State participation, fiscal fairness, transparent procedures, and judicially enforceable constitutional limits. It concludes that an effective federal system requires a balance in which the Union can pursue legitimate national objectives while States retain sufficient constitutional and practical autonomy to address regional priorities. Sustained inter-governmental dialogue and respect for constitutional boundaries are essential for maintaining India's federal equilibrium.