Concordia — A Mathematical Abstraction: A Non-Governing Thought Experiment

Abstract

This paper presents a deliberately simplified mathematical abstraction of the central institutional argument behind The Concordia Trust of Reykjavík: societies have developed far greater capacity for preparing conflict than for preparing peace, and that imbalance shapes the options available to sovereign decision-makers. Using basic notation, the paper examines how increased institutional capacity for peace may enlarge the set of credible constructive options, reveal areas of feasible overlap between sovereign interests, and make cooperation strategically preferable to destructive competition under some conditions. It also expresses the underlying logic of Provisio, Concordia, Prosperitas and Mutually Assured Construction in compact form. The abstraction is not a predictive model, a theory of diplomatic behavior, or a claim that peace can be reduced to utility maximization. Its purpose is narrower: to expose how preparation influences choice and to restate, in another language, the proposition that serious constructive options can widen the field of sovereign possibility.