Conflict between Scripture and Inference in Argumentation: A Comparison of Nyāya and Mādhva-Vedānta in Medieval India

Abstract

Abstract This article compares the role assigned to scripture ( āgama ) and to inference ( anumāna ) in the argumentation theory of two medieval Indian traditions: the Nyāya school after Udayana, and the Dvaita-Vedānta school of Madhva and his commentator Jayatīrtha. It argues that the relation between these two means of valid cognition ( pramāṇa ) cannot be captured by a simple prioritization of ‘scripture over inference’ or its converse. Two dimensions must instead be kept apart: an epistemological one, concerning which means of valid cognition is foundational, and a procedural one, concerning which must be advanced first in the conduct of a debate. On the shared verdict the schools do not differ: a correct scripture overrides any inference that conflicts with it. Read along the two axes, however, they prove to be mirror images. For the Naiyāyikas inference is primary on both counts, since it is inference that establishes the authority of scripture; for the Dvaita-Vedāntins scripture is primary on both, its authority being self-standing and owing nothing to inference. The Dvaita position is not, however, the mere subordination of inference to scripture it is often taken to be. Inference, barred only as the opening move before scripture, is retained as rational ground ( upapatti ) within the interpretive determination of scriptural meaning, a determination that, on Jayatīrtha’s account, is itself part of what makes a text function as scripture.