A Taoist ‘Still Point’: Governing East Turkistan in an Age of Revolution (1912–1928)

Abstract

The first quarter of the twentieth century plunged China and its periphery into systemic collapse and ideological ferment. Amidst this turmoil—encompassing the Qing Dynasty’s fall, the rise of warlordism and revolutionary movements in Russia and Central Asia—East Turkistan under Yang Zengxin presented a geopolitical anomaly: a frontier that remained stable under Chinese sovereignty. This article addresses: How did Yang engineer this stability against overwhelming odds? Drawing on Yang’s monographs, restricted documents from the Xinjiang Historical Documents and multilingual sources (Uyghur, Chinese and English), this study argues that Yang’s success stemmed from his application of Taoist political statecraft. Although his strategy cannot be categorised as Taoist only, it can be said that his governance demonstrated core Taoist tenets: wuwei (strategic non-intervention), yumin (maintaining population simple) and the ‘power of weakness’ through a minimalist military policy and strategic balancing. Yang’s self-authored biography the Buguozhai Riji, along with his personal engagement with Taoist thought, accounts in the Xinjiang Historical Documents and modern Chinese scholars’ academic research, further reinforces his Taoist statecraft in the region. Through these methods, Yang constructed a version of the Taoist ‘small state’ (xiao guo gua min), a sealed political entity insulated from revolutionary ideologies and conflicts beyond its borders. This study offers a framework for understanding early twentieth-century China–East Turkistan relations, positioning Yang as a practitioner of classical political philosophy. It demonstrates the relevance of Taoist statecraft as a model for crisis governance and frontier administration, illustrating the interplay between ancient thought and modern political survival.