From Algorithmic Fragmentation to the Narrative Construction of the Self

Abstract

This theoretical study extends the model previously developed in Dynamique de la conscience et fragmentation du temps vécu face aux dispositifs algorithmiques (Ben Mabrouk, 2026) by examining the consequences of algorithmically induced fragmentation on autobiographical memory and the narrative construction of the self. Whereas the previous work focused on how algorithmic environments repeatedly disrupt the continuity of lived experience and alter the temporal organization of consciousness, the present study investigates the mechanisms through which consciousness may compensate for this fragmentation. Drawing upon phenomenology (Husserl), narrative identity theory (Ricœur; McAdams), autobiographical memory research (Conway; Tulving), source-monitoring theory (Johnson et al.), false-memory research (Loftus), and psychoanalytic perspectives (Freud; Winnicott), we propose an integrative conceptual framework in which the interruption of experiential continuity creates narrative gaps that may be progressively compensated by imaginative scenario construction. Within this framework, imagination is not considered pathological but rather as a normal adaptive function capable of restoring subjective coherence when lived experience no longer provides sufficient narrative continuity. The central hypothesis introduces the concept of algorithmic narrative compensation, defined as the tendency of consciousness to generate, repeat, emotionally invest, and eventually integrate imagined scenarios into autobiographical narrative in response to the fragmentation of lived experience produced by algorithmic digital environments. Through repetition, emotional reinforcement, social communication, and interaction with digital technologies—including conversational artificial intelligence—these scenarios may progressively acquire autobiographical significance while preserving important distinctions between imagination, reconstruction, false memory, voluntary deception, and psychotic phenomena. Rather than claiming that digital technologies directly produce psychopathology, the study argues that they may modify the conditions under which personal identity is narratively constructed by increasing the frequency of attentional discontinuities and the need for compensatory narrative organization. The paper therefore proposes a theoretical mechanism linking algorithmic fragmentation, imaginative reconstruction, autobiographical memory, and identity formation, while outlining empirical research strategies capable of testing these hypotheses. By extending the previous model of algorithmic consciousness toward a theory of autobiographical narrative reconstruction, this work offers an interdisciplinary contribution at the intersection of philosophy, cognitive psychology, memory studies, and psychoanalysis.