Authentication of a Heterogeneous Information and Control Network of Autonomous Oceanographic Platforms Based on a SAW-PUF Architecture

Abstract

Protecting a heterogeneous information and control network of autonomous oceanographic platforms (surface buoys and underwater gliders/probes) requires authentication protocols built on the multichannel AlN-SAW physical unclonable function (PUF) architecture proposed in the authors' earlier work. The problem's relevance stems from the network's vulnerability to physical interference (theft, vandalism, node spoofing) and from the tight requirements on incident-response speed: a compromised node must be detected and stripped of trust before it can distort environmental or industrial monitoring data used for regulatory and commercial reporting. The paper first describes a model of the network to be protected, then a threat model specific to it, and derives from that threat model the required set of protection protocols — rather than the other way around. The proposed solution is shown to provide the required level of protection under the harsh implementation constraints (an extremely narrow-band underwater acoustic channel, a wide temperature range, and the impossibility of repeated physical access to the device at sea), while preserving the theoretical character of the original series.