Social Engineering as a Weapon of Information Warfare: Evidence from the 2026 Iran–Israel–U.S. Conflict

Abstract

This article examines the growing role of social engineering as a weapon of information warfare, with particular attention to the 2026 Iran–Israel–United States conflict. While social engineering has traditionally been studied as a cybersecurity technique designed to manipulate individuals into revealing sensitive information or providing unauthorized access, its role in contemporary geopolitical conflicts has become considerably broader. In an information environment characterized by uncertainty, rapid communication, and widespread dependence on social media, the manipulation of human trust can serve strategic purposes beyond conventional cyber intrusion. The study focuses on how techniques such as impersonation, spear-phishing, fabricated identities, deceptive communication, information manipulation, and AI-generated content can contribute to broader influence operations. Previous investigations by U.S. government agencies have documented Iranian state-linked cyber and influence activities involving social engineering, impersonation, and the use of stolen or manipulated information. More recent analyses of the 2026 conflict have also highlighted the increasing importance of information warfare, artificial intelligence, disinformation, and cyber operations in the confrontation between Iran, Israel, and the United States. Rather than treating social engineering solely as a technical cybersecurity problem, this article approaches it as a human-centered mechanism of information warfare. The central argument is that the effectiveness of such operations may depend not only on whether an attacker can penetrate a technical system, but also on whether the attacker can influence what individuals believe, whom they trust, and how they respond to information during periods of crisis. The 2026 conflict provides an important case for examining this relationship because military operations, cyber activities, social-media narratives, and information campaigns have developed simultaneously. Recent assessments have described cyberspace as an important domain of escalation in the conflict, while contemporary analyses have identified AI-generated content, disinformation, propaganda, influence campaigns, and offensive and defensive cyber operations as interconnected components of the broader information environment. By examining these developments through the theoretical lens of social engineering, the article seeks to contribute to the growing literature on cyber-enabled influence operations, cognitive warfare, and hybrid conflict. It argues that the human factor should be considered a strategic component of modern information warfare and that effective defense requires more than conventional cybersecurity controls. Strengthening information verification, digital literacy, identity authentication, and cognitive resilience may become increasingly important as artificial intelligence makes deceptive content easier to produce and distribute at scale.