Elite perceptions of the legitimacy of asymmetric fiscal decentralisation: evidence from Spain

Abstract

Abstract This article examines the conditions under which asymmetric arrangements granting enhanced fiscal powers to minority nationalist regions sustain or undermine the legitimacy of the territorial decentralisation model among the remaining regions, drawing on evidence from Spain. While fiscal federalism scholarship has largely focussed on whether asymmetric arrangements accommodate minority nationalist regions and reduce secessionist pressures, less attention has been paid to how such arrangements are perceived by regions operating under the common decentralisation framework. Building on theories of concessionary federalism, the article argues that the stability of asymmetric systems depends not only on negotiated concessions between central governments and minority regions, but also on the conditional acceptance of those settlements by governments in other regions. Drawing on elite interviews with representatives of finance departments in four Spanish autonomous communities—Andalusia, Extremadura, Murcia and the Valencian Community—contextualised with survey data on public attitudes towards Spain’s territorial model, the study examines three dimensions of legitimacy: procedural legitimacy, systemic coherence and distributive fairness. The findings suggest that fiscal asymmetry is less likely to be accepted when it is seen as insufficiently transparent, as weakening the broader decentralised system or as generating persistent distributive grievances. Under such conditions, asymmetric arrangements may generate new territorial tensions rather than promoting stability. The article highlights the importance of transparent bargaining, robust intergovernmental forums and perceived fairness in sustaining the legitimacy of asymmetric decentralisation.