Does Quantum Indeterminacy Rescue Free Will? The Measurement Problem and the Limits of Anti-Determinism

Abstract

This article examines whether quantum indeterminacy provides a sufficient metaphysical basis for libertarian free will. It argues that although quantum mechanics may undermine the strongest form of classical physical determinism, the existence of objective chance does not by itself establish agent control, authorship, or moral responsibility. The study employs conceptual and comparative philosophical analysis, drawing on foundational work in quantum mechanics and contemporary theories of free will. The article compares Copenhagen-type interpretations, many-worlds theory, Bohmian mechanics, objective-collapse models, and superdeterminism according to their treatment of determinism, probability, and wave-function collapse. It then evaluates event-causal libertarianism, agent-causal libertarianism, modest libertarianism, and compatibilism, using the luck objection as the central critical test. The article concludes that quantum indeterminacy may be a necessary enabling condition for some forms of libertarianism, but it is not a sufficient explanation of free will. Its principal contribution is to distinguish physical indeterminism from agent-level control and to show why the transition from objective chance to responsible agency requires an independent philosophical theory of authorship.