THE LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGICAL HUMAN ENHANCEMENT A PHILOSOPHICAL AND ETHICAL CRITIQUE OF TRANSHUMANISM

Abstract

This article presents a philosophical and ethical critique of transhumanism, with particular attention to projects aimed at radically enhancing the human body and mind through artificial intelligence, neurotechnology, implants, biotechnology, and human–machine integration. The study examines the main assumptions of transhumanist thought, including the belief that technological progress can overcome biological limitations, extend human life, increase cognitive capacities, and ultimately lead to the emergence of a posthuman form of existence. It argues that these promises are based on a reductionist understanding of the human person and insufficiently address the moral, social, political, and existential consequences of technological enhancement. The article introduces the concept of “destructive transhumanism” to describe forms of technological development that may undermine human autonomy, privacy, equality, personal identity, and responsibility. Particular attention is given to the risks associated with neurotechnologies, artificial intelligence, corporate control over human data, social inequality, and the gradual normalization of permanent technological intervention in the human body. The analysis does not reject therapeutic medicine or technologies designed to restore lost functions. Instead, it distinguishes medical treatment from enhancement projects aimed at creating a technologically superior human being. The article concludes that technological progress should remain subordinated to human dignity, ethical responsibility, democratic oversight, and the protection of fundamental rights.