The Solution to the Is-Ought Problem based on Critical Rationalism and Evolutionary Theory

Abstract

This paper solves the is-ought problem on the basis of critical rationalism, the Quine-Duhem thesis, and the value-theoretic part of Bunge’s ontology. It reconstructs the dogmatization of Hume's demand for justification into a barrier thesis. The naturalistic fallacy is identified as a special case of the definist fallacy and rejected as a barrier against naturalistic ethics. The paper shows that values and ought-concepts, construed as categorical, monadic, one-place predicates, are untestable against reality and forfeit their claim to represent it. I further show that existing formal proof attempts hold only within specific systems, disqualifying them as candidates for solving the problem. It shows that no general impossibility proof against is-ought inferences can be provided. The goal-relative ophelic ought-operator is reconstructed as the only known normative operator compatible with reality and ordinary usage. Lineage fitness is reconstructed via evolutionary theory as the non-freely chosen teleonomic ultimate goal of all living systems, from which normative statements follow formally without independently stipulated ethical premises. This solves the is-ought problem and yields a normative yardstick for rational ethical assessment whose assumptions, derivation, and normative consequences remain equally open to criticism and testable against experience. Eine Deutsche Version kann hier gefunden werden: https://philpapers.org/rec/DELDLD-13