Ali Shehadeh

Data-Driven Risk Allocation and Incentive-Compatible Payment Schemes in Construction Contracts: Integrating Comparative Standard Forms, Public Works Disputes, and Principal–Agent Modeling

Abstract Construction projects worldwide suffer from misaligned risk allocation, poorly chosen payment schemes, and opaque claims and dispute processes, leading to chronic cost overruns and litigation. Building on comparative analyses of widely used international and national sta...

Construction-to-lifecycle risk intelligence: a noise-robust Physics-Informed Temporal Graph Transformer and Bayesian Markov-Switching sample-selection framework for reinforcement and repair decisions

Construction projects require sequential decisions on structural reinforcement during execution and repair prioritization during operation under heterogeneous conditions, incomplete inspections, temporal dependence and non-engineering constraints. This study develops a constructi...

AI-Enabled Performance-Based Procurement and Life-Cycle Maintenance of Highway Bridges: Integrating Single-Bid Risk Analytics and PPP Payment Optimization

Abstract Aging bridges, tight budgets, and procurement inefficiencies require a data-driven approach to maintenance contracts. Existing evidence shows that information and communication technology (ICT)–based construction management improves site productivity but remains unevenly...

Reliability-constrained dynamic assignment and slot pricing for urban construction logistics: a game-theoretic bilevel model

Urban construction logistics injects time-critical deliveries into congested corridors precisely when work-zones suppress capacity and raise travel-time variability. We formulate a logistics-oriented, game-theoretic bilevel framework that coordinates work-zone capacity, delivery...

Game-Theoretic Design of International Construction Contracts: Integrating Liquidated Damages, Consortium Structures, and Performance Guarantees

Abstract Delays and cost overruns remain endemic in international infrastructure projects. This study develops a unified game-theoretic for contractor schedule incentives under liquidated damages (LDs), extensions of time (EOTs), and multicontractor or consortium structures. We m...